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CAN’T TOUCH THIS? MAKING A PLACE FOR 
TOUCH DNA IN POST-CONVICTION DNA 
TESTING STATUTES 
Victoria Kawecki+ 
DNA testing is to justice what the telescope is for the stars: not a 
lesson in biochemistry, not a display of the wonders of magnifying 
optical glass, but a way to see things as they really are.  It is a 
revelation machine”1 
On February 11, 1987, in Fort Collins, Colorado, a passing cyclist 
discovered the body of a brutally murdered woman exposed in an open field.2  
Earlier that morning, fifteen-year-old Timothy Masters had seen the same 
body.3  Convincing himself that the body was a mannequin, Masters did not 
report the sighting to police.4  This misstep, coupled with the proximity of the 
Masters’s home to the crime scene 5  and the discovery of questionable 
“character” evidence,6 led investigators to interrogate Masters for ten hours 
                     
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2011, Gettysburg College.  The author wishes to thank John Sharifi for his exceptional and 
invaluable insight, guidance, dedication, tenacity, and inspiration throughout this process.  She 
would also like to thank her colleagues on the Catholic University Law Review for their work on 
this Comment, and her legal writing professors, who taught her to question what she thinks she 
may know and to always lead with her conclusion. 
 1. BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFIELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE 
GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT xviii (2003) [hereinafter SCHECK ET AL.]. 
 2. Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979, 983 (Colo. 2002).  The partially nude body of  
thirty-seven-year-old Peggy Hettrick was found “murdered and sexually mutilated” in a field in 
Fort Collins, Colorado.  Drawn to Murder (CBS News television broadcast Dec. 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/ 8301-18559_162-6025618/drawn-to-murder/.  According 
to medical reports, Hettrick was fatally stabbed in the back with a five-inch serrated knife.  
Masters, 58 P.3d at 983. 
 3. According to Masters’s father, Masters normally walked straight through the field each 
morning on his way to school; however, on the day of the murder, Masters visibly hesitated, 
veered off course, and stopped—actions his father later interpreted as obvious indications that 
Masters had seen the body.  Drawn to Murder, supra note 2. 
 4. TIMOTHY MASTERS WITH STEVE LEHTO, DRAWN TO INJUSTICE 3 (2012) (explaining 
that the body resembled a Resusci Anne Simulator doll which is normally used for CPR practice).  
The cyclist that eventually reported the discovery to the police also mistook the victim’s remains 
for a mannequin.  Drawn to Murder, supra note 2.  Investigators noted that the victim’s body was 
clean of blood, which added credibility to Masters’s assumption.  Id. 
 5. Masters, 58 P.3d at 983 (explaining that “[t]he body was left within several hundred feet 
of [Masters’s] home, and could be seen from [his] bedroom window”). 
 6. The Colorado Supreme Court admitted into evidence numerous graphic drawings, 
writings with sexual overtones, and a suitcase filled with pornographic photographs of female 
genetalia, all seized from Masters.  Id. at 983–84.  Although the Colorado Supreme Court held 
that some of the drawings and writings could only lead to an inference of bad character, which is 
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shortly after the murder, and to arrest him ten years later.7   Masters was 
charged and later convicted of a murder he did not commit.8  After spending 
almost a decade in prison, Masters was released in 2008.9  Masters’s release 
and exoneration were partially based on the cutting-edge deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) analysis of microscopic skin cells left behind by the perpetrator on the 
victim’s clothing,10 a method colloquially known as “touch DNA” testing.11  
Fortunately for Masters, Colorado’s post-conviction DNA testing statute, 
which permits testing of biological evidence if the petitioner proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that “[f]avorable results of the DNA testing will 
demonstrate the petitioner’s actual innocence,” is broad enough to allow DNA 
analysis of skin cells. 12   Masters, in this regard, was lucky to have been 
prosecuted in Colorado. 
Although states acknowledge the importance of providing avenues for 
demonstrating actual innocence, inmates are often severly hampered by 
restrictive post-conviction DNA testing statutes in many states often limiting 
access to the type of DNA testing that led to Masters’s exoneration.13  The 
ability to obtain any kind of post-conviction DNA testing hinges on the 
structure of the statute.  The availability of specific types of DNA testing 
depends on the statute’s definition of testable material (“biological material 
requirement”), and its emphasis on the expected impact of the testing 
                                                
prohibited by Colorado Rule of Evidence 404, the court found that their admission was “harmless 
error” in light of the entire record.  Id. at 1002–04 (applying COLO. R. EVID. 404(b)). 
 7. Drawn to Murder, supra note 2.  After Masters’s father—his only alibi witness—died, 
the state again pursued Masters’s arrest by reevaluating previously collected evidence.  MASTERS 
WITH LEHTO, supra note 4, at 148–49. 
 8. Masters, 58 P.3d at 983 (noting Masters’s conviction by jury verdict). 
 9. Trevor Hughes, Tim Masters Formally Exonerated for 1987 Murder of Peggy Hettrick 
of Fort Collins, THE COLORADOAN (Fort Collins, Colo.) (June 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.coloradoan.com/article/20110628/UPDATES01/110628016/Tim-Masters-formally 
-exonerated-1987-murder-Peggy-Hettrick-Fort-Collins. 
 10. Miles Moffett, DA Set to Drop Masters Case, DENVER POST (Jan. 25, 2008), 
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_8071788.  The Masters defense team traveled to Amsterdam, 
where the victim’s clothing underwent touch DNA testing.  Drawn to Murder, supra note 2. 
 11. Touch DNA, BODE TECHNOLOGY, http://www.bodetech.com/forensic-solutions/dna 
-technologies/touch-dna/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (explaining that touch DNA can link 
perpetrators to a particular crime if the perpetrator leaves enough skin cells behind on an item at 
the crime scene). 
 12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-413(1)(a)–(b) (2012).  Similar to the District of Columbia’s 
Innocence Protection Act (IPA), the Colorado statute uses equivocal language, such as the term 
“demonstrate.”  See infra notes 121, 173 and accompanying text (analogizing the IPA’s 
materiality language to a “some evidence” standard). 
 13. See, e.g., State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 188–90 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (denying an 
application for touch DNA testing despite the petitioner’s argument that the purpose of the statute 
is to provide access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence), cert. denied, 33 A.3d 739 (Conn. 
2011); Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 560, 566 (D.C. 2011) (denying an application for 
touch DNA testing despite the IPA’s alleged purpose to allow access to “powerful techniques of 
DNA analysis”). 
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(“materiality requirement”). 14   Some statutes broadly define biological 
material, allowing for touch DNA testing if the petitioner can show—with 
varying levels of certainty—that the test results will support his or her claim of 
innocence.15  Other statutes regulate the types of evidence that can be tested to 
such an extent that touch DNA is not plainly eligible for post-conviction 
consideration.16  Finally, the District of Columbia’s Innocence Protection Act 
(IPA) definitively repudiates touch DNA testing. 17   The IPA altogether 
precludes post-conviction touch DNA testing, setting a potentially dangerous 
precedent for other jurisdictions with similar statutes.18  Had Masters sought 
post-conviction relief in the District of Columbia, he would probably still be 
incarcerated. 
The IPA is an extreme example of the problematic and restrictive language 
that plagues many post-conviction DNA testing statutes.19  Typical of this type 
of statute, the IPA presents two obstacles that a touch-DNA petitioner must 
overcome.  First, the statute requires that the testing will help to demonstrate 
the petitioner’s actual innocence. 20   Second, the IPA limits testing to 
                     
 14. See infra Part I.D (explaining the significance of the biological material and materiality 
requirements in post-conviction DNA testing statutes in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and 
Texas). 
 15. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(a)(5)(iii) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 
2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.71(B), 2953.74(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (allowing for 
post-conviction DNA testing if the petitioner has met certain requirements, including a showing 
that the results are “outcome determinative”). 
 16. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk(a) (2009), construed in Solman, 29 A.3d at 188 
(holding that there must “be a factual basis to conclude that biological evidence is present on the 
evidence prior to testing,” which must be more than a good-faith assertion); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a)–(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012), construed in Swearingen v. State, 303 
S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that the statute requires “that all evidence to be 
tested must first be proven to contain biological material”). 
 17. Hood, 28 A.3d at 566 (discussing D.C. CODE § 22-4133(2001 & Supp. 2012)).  The IPA 
includes a collection of post-conviction statutes.  D.C. CODE §§ 22-4131 to 22-4135 (2001  
& Supp. 2012).  This Comment uses the collective “IPA,” even when discussing the specific  
post-conviction DNA testing provision. 
 18. Hood, 28 A.3d at 557–60.  Nevertheless, the IPA is considered a model  
post-conviction remedy statute  Unavailability of Adequate Post-Conviction Remedies,  
MID-ATLANTIC INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.exonerate.org/about-2/causes-of-wrongful 
-convictions/unavailability-of-adequate-post-conviction-remedies/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).  
Judicial interpretation of the IPA’s restrictive provisions could influence those states where 
appellate courts have not yet considered touch DNA evidence.  See, e.g., infra note 144 (noting 
that Maryland and the District of Columbia appear to be the only jurisdictions in which the 
highest appellate courts have considered touch DNA evidence under their post-conviction DNA 
testing statutes). 
 19. See infra Part I.D. (discussing different types of biological material and materiality 
requirements that are commonly found in post-conviction DNA testing statutes). 
 20. D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (requiring a “reasonable probability” that DNA testing will 
“help establish that the applicant was actually innocent”). 
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“biological material,” 21  which it strictly defines to include only seven 
materials: the contents of a “sexual assault forensic kit, semen, vaginal fluid, 
blood, saliva, visible skin tissue,” and, in some instances, hair.22 
In 2011, the D.C. Court of Appeals squarely faced the question of whether a 
request for touch DNA testing could be granted under the IPA in Hood v. 
United States.23  In Hood the petitioner was charged with murder after he was 
found inside the home of the dying victim.24  Although the petitioner argued at 
trial that he was in the victim’s home to defend her from a third-party attacker, 
the jury found him guilty.25  Following the enactment of the IPA, the petitioner 
moved for touch DNA testing, claiming that the testing would identify the 
actual assailant. 26   The court foreclosed the opportunity to test the DNA 
contained in skin cells, interpreting the statute’s “visible skin tissue” 
qualification to exclude samples that could not be seen by the unaided eye.27  
The court also concluded that the testing requested would not meet the 
statute’s materiality requirement.28 
The court’s interpretation of the IPA highlights the counterintuitive nature of 
the statute’s language: although enacted to provide relief  
to the wrongfully convicted,29 the statute prohibits the testing of probative 
evidence.30  The D.C. Council has recognized this juridical gap and, after the 
Hood decision, has considered redefining “biological material” in the IPA to 
allow for touch DNA testing. 31   The Council’s amendment process has 
                     
 21. Id. § 22-4133(a) (allowing petitioners to “apply to the court for DNA testing of 
biological material” that meets the requirements of the statute). 
 22. Id. § 22-4131(2) (emphasis added).  This definition applies to the IPA in its entirety, not 
only to the post-conviction DNA testing provision.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4131 (explaining 
that the section’s definitions apply to the entire chapter). 
 23. 28 A.3d 553, 555 (D.C. 2011); see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Hood, 28 A.3d 
553 (No. 08-CO-1581) (framing the issue on appeal as a case of misapplication and 
misinterpretation of the IPA). 
 24. Hood, 28 A.3d at 556–57. 
 25. Id. at 557. 
 26. See id. at 557–58 (noting that the appellant sought to establish that he was not the 
assailant by requesting DNA testing of evidence found at the crime scene). 
 27. Id. at 559–60. 
 28. Id. at 564–66 (finding that the IPA requires a petitioner to make a showing of more than 
a mere possibility that the results would prove his or her innocence). 
 29. COUNCIL OF THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 14th Council Period 
B. 14-153 (2001) [hereinafter D.C. COMM. REP.].  The appellant in Hood contended that the 
purpose of the IPA “is to enable wrongfully convicted persons to use the powerful techniques of 
DNA analysis to prove their innocence.”  Hood, 28 A.3d at 560. 
 30. Hood, 28 A.3d at 563 (noting that the IPA is exceptional because, although it establishes 
a right to post-conviction DNA testing, a petitioner’s request to test trace amounts of skin cells 
that could potentially exonerate a petitioner can still be denied). 
 31. In July 2012, D.C. Councilmember Mary Cheh proposed the “Innocence Protection 
Amendment Act of 2012,” which seeks to define “biological material” more broadly to ensure the 
availability of DNA testing for “potentially exonerating evidence.”  B. 19-880, 19th Council 
Period (D.C. 2012). 
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revealed the difficulty in wording a post-conviction statute to fairly balance 
competing interests without prohibiting touch DNA evidence testing.32 
This Comment presents an alternative to the limiting threshold that the IPA 
and other similarly restrictive statutes place on an inmate seeking access to 
potentially exonerative touch DNA testing.  Part I provides a brief history of 
the use of DNA technology in criminal investigations and in the courtroom.  
This Comment then briefly discusses the rapid evolution of DNA testing 
technology, specifically focusing on touch DNA.  Part I concludes by 
explaining the common requirements for relief in state post-conviction DNA 
testing statutes.  Part II categorizes these statutes by whether the language 
permits touch DNA testing.  Finally, Part III suggests that unreasonably 
restrictive statutes, such as the IPA, should be restructured to combine a 
discerning materiality requirement with a technologically neutral biological 
material requirement.  A standard that balances the importance of rectifying 
wrongful convictions with the value of preserving state resources allows 
actually innocent individuals to further capitalize on the “revelation machine”33 
that is DNA technology. 
I.  THE NEW “GOLD STANDARD”:34 DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Considered common parlance in today’s courtroom, DNA refers to the 
genetic material found in each cell that encodes biological identity.35  The 
human genome consists of 3.2 billion nucleotides strung together to form the 
familiar double helix.36  Disentangling the double helix revealed that roughly 
99.5 to 99.7% of genetic material is identical among all humans. 37   The 
                     
 32. See Public Hearing: B. 19-880, Innocence Protection Amendment Act of 2012  
& Re-entry Faciliatation Amendment of 2012 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 19th Council 
Period (D.C. Sept. 25, 2012), http://dc.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=12&clip_id=1396 
[hereinafter IPA Amendment Hearing] (video recording of public hearing accessed through 
Council Hearings Archive). 
 33. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at xviii (comparing DNA testing to telescopes for its 
ability to reveal previously unknown evidence in criminal cases). 
 34. Mark Hansen, The Uncertain Science of Evidence, 91 A.B.A. J. 48, 50 (2005) (quoting 
Paul C. Giannelli, Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University) (characterizing DNA 
analysis as the “gold standard” among forensic sciences). 
 35. See Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 291, 294 (2010); see also DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 5 (2010) (noting the long history of using genetics in the courtroom); RON C. 
MICHAELIS, ROBERT G. FLANDERS, JR. & PAULA H. WULFF, A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO DNA: 
FROM THE LABORATORY TO THE COURTROOM 215 (2008) [hereinafter MICHAELIS ET AL.] 
(describing briefly the history of DNA analysis in the courtroom). 
 36. See Murphy, supra note 35, at 294 (noting that the human genome consists of 
nucleotides stored in paired chromosomes).  DNA is composed of two strands of nucleotides that 
are bound together to form a double-helix structure.  MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 7–8. 
 37. KAYE, supra note 35, at 42–43; Murphy, supra note 35, at 294–95. 
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remaining miniscule percentage denotes an individual’s unique genetic 
information.38 
In 1984, British geneticist Sir Alec Jeffreys discovered this variation in the 
DNA nucleotide sequence, using restriction fragment length polymorphism 
(RFLP) technology39 to isolate portions of the DNA strands.40  Through this 
methodology—called “DNA fingerprinting”—Jeffreys was able to identify 
individuals by their DNA.41 
A.  Rapidly Evolving Technology 
One of RFLP technology’s drawbacks is that it requires a large amount of 
DNA to produce an accurate result. 42   To combat this problem, scientists 
developed polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analysis, a method that can 
replicate small quantities of DNA exponentially to create a usable sample.43  A 
                     
 38. KAYE, supra note 35, at 42–43; Murphy, supra note 35, at 294–95.  There are 
“standard locations in the [human] genome where the sequence” of nucleotides varies enough to 
distinguish individuals.  NORAH RUDIN & KEITH INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA 
ANALYSIS 38 (2d ed. 2002). 
 39. See Kamrin T. MacKnight, Comment, The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): The 
Second Generation of DNA Analysis Methods Takes the Stand, 9 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER  
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 287, 294, 296–97 (1993) (explaining, in detail, the process of isolating 
genetically distinct material using RFLP technology); see also KAYE, supra note 35, at 43–47 
(same). 
 40. Polymorphism refers to the variation in genetic information at a locus, a molecular 
location in the genome.  RUDIN & INMAN, supra note 38, at 38. 
 41. MacKnight, supra note 39, at 294.  This process identified patterns in the DNA strands 
that were specific to the individual from whom the genetic material was drawn.  Id. at 296–97; 
see also Ricardo Fontg, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide to Admissibility and Use, 57 
MO. L. REV. 501, 506 (1992) (explaining that DNA fingerprinting can identify individuals with 
“virtual certainty”). 
 42. This cumbersome aspect of RFLP testing was problematic in cases in which the amount 
of DNA left by the perpetrator was negligible, or, in older cases, where the DNA sample had 
degraded over time.  See United States v. Morrow, 374 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65 (D.D.C. 2005).  DNA 
testing was therefore unavailable in cases even in which the assailant left behind DNA evidence. 
SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 46.  For example, in the post-conviction proceedings for Marion 
Coakley, who was convicted of rape, Coakley’s lawyers attempted to use the newly developed 
DNA fingerprinting technology when the semen left at the crime scene did not produce a large 
enough sample for DNA testing.  Coakley v. State, 571 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868–70 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 
1991); see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 45–46. 
 43. United States v. Lowe, 954 F. Supp. 401, 408–09 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that PCR 
technology “is important for forensics because it permits DNA profiling of samples containing 
much smaller quantities of DNA—such as saliva on a cigarette butt—that cannot be tested via the 
RFLP method”).  However, PCR is more properly used as an exclusion method rather than as a 
positive identification mechanism because of the difference in probability statistics between 
RFLP and PCR testing.  Id. at 409–10; Morrow, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 58–59.  For a detailed 
discussion of the differences between PCR and RFLP testing, see generally Lowe, 954 F. Supp. at 
409–10; and KAYE, supra note 35, at 178–87.  Similarly, courts recognized the fact that PCR 
testing is more susceptible to contamination than its RFLP counterpart, requiring greater care in 
testing and analysis.  KAYE, supra note 35, at 178–79.  But cf. id. at 179 (finding “[n]o major 
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further technological advancement called short tandem repeats (STR) analysis 
blends the speed and quantity-production of PCR analysis with the exactness 
of RFLP testing to create an improved technique.44  STR analysis, aided by 
PCR amplification, has become the predominant method by which DNA 
samples are analyzed.45 
B.  Practical Application: DNA Evidence in the Courtroom 
Investigators and attorneys began using DNA fingerprinting almost 
immediately following its inception to aid in identifying—and  
excluding—potential perpetrators.46  Judicial reaction to this new evidentiary 
tool was initially positive, and very few questions concerning validity and 
admissibility arose as DNA evidence was used in the courtroom.47  But, as 
DNA evidence became more common, judicial reception of DNA 
identification and inculpation chilled.48  Poor quality evidence49 combined with 
                                                
judicial opinions expressing significant misgivings emerged to slow the transfer of the 
technology”). 
 44. See KAYE, supra note 35, at 187–91 (providing a detailed discussion of STR testing).  
STR analysis begins with the amplification techniques of PCR, creating a large enough sample 
size for further analysis. See Morrow, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (explaining, in detail, the PCR 
process).  These copies are used to create a tandem repeat—“multiple copies of an identical DNA 
sequence arranged in direct succession in a particular region of a chromosome”—which is 
measured to reveal the alleles present at that part of the chromosome and then used to build the 
individual DNA profile.  Id. 
 45. Catherine Arcabasico, Chimeras: Double the DNA-Double the Fun for Crime Scene 
Investigators, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435, 449 (2007) (noting 
that PCR-STR testing is the most widely used testing method in both the field of molecular 
biology and the criminal justice system). 
 46. KAYE, supra note 35, at 54–56 (discussing the value of DNA fingerprinting’s ability to 
produce results “completely specific to [the] individual” in criminal investigations); see also 
JUSTIN BROOKS, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 339–42 & n.1 (2010) 
(discussing the role DNA evidence played in the Pitchfork case, which was the first application of 
DNA fingerprinting to a criminal case) (reprinting and annotating R v. Pitchfork, (2009) EWCA 
(Crim) 963, (1)–(2), (11), (13) (Eng.), available at 2009 WL 1321737 (reaffirming the 
defendant’s 1988 conviction)). 
 47. See KAYE, supra note 35, at 60; see also, e.g., People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 
644 (Albany Cnty. Ct. 1988) (citing the admissibility of DNA evidence as a question of first 
impression but ultimately considering DNA evidence to be “the single greatest advance in the 
‘search for truth,’ and the goal of convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, since the 
advent of cross-examination”), aff’d, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), aff’d, 83 
N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. 1994). 
 48. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995–96, 998–99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).  
The court added a third prong to the admissibility test established in Frye v. United States.  Id. at 
995–96 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923)).  The new prong required a 
pretrial hearing to determine if the laboratory that performed the analysis employed the proper 
techniques.  Id.  The court concluded that the DNA evidence was not admissible to prove the 
presence of the victim’s blood on the defendant’s watch because the laboratory failed to use 
generally accepted testing techniques.  Id. at 998–99. 
 49. See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426-28 (Minn. 1989) (excluding DNA 
evidence proffered by the government after expressing concerns over false positives, incorrect 
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more stringent standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence50 resulted 
in an unwillingness to admit DNA evidence and caused courts to subject DNA 
testing “to considerably more intense scrutiny than any of the other forensic 
sciences.”51  However, with increased judicial oversight and more reliable and 
accurate technology, modern DNA testing has been “rigorously validated” in 
the legal community,52 and U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts has 
asserted that “there is no technology comparable” to PCR-STR testing.53 
C.  Touch DNA 
Improvements in the efficiency and accuracy of methods for building DNA 
profiles opened the door for new sources of testable DNA evidence, including 
touch DNA.54  Touch DNA refers to the genetic information recovered from 
epithelial (skin) cells left behind when a person makes contact with an object.55  
During the commission of a crime, an assailant can leave touch DNA samples 
                                                
matches, the overall unreliability of DNA testing, and the laboratory’s failure to use scientifically 
accepted techniques); MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 50 (explaining that RFLP tests 
produced poor quality data for its earliest court appearances, thus “illustrat[ing] the need for 
quality control and quality assurance programs”).  Some courts are still wary of DNA evidence’s 
reliability due to the potential for human error.  See, e.g., United States v. Bentham, 414 F. Supp. 
2d 472, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (highlighting the consequences of human error in DNA testing). 
 50. The Federal Rules of Evidence, although considered to establish more liberal standards 
than their predecessors, actually provide a more rigorous test for the admissibility of DNA 
evidence.  See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–92 (1993) 
(interpreting FED. R. EVID. 702) (determining that the new Rules of Evidence superseded the 
Frye test and replaced the “general acceptance” of the scientific community requirement with a 
more burdensome standard requiring the trial judge to assess the scientific validity and reliability 
of the testing procedures that produced the evidence).  The Daubert requirements also necessitate 
more pretrial hearings on the admissibility of expert witness testimony.  MICHAELIS ET AL., supra 
note 35, at 220.  Although judges currently have more discretion regarding the admissibility of 
DNA evidence, the Daubert standards mandate closer scrutiny of the validity and reliability of the 
evidence.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (requiring the trial judge to “ensure that any and all 
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable”). 
 51. MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 215. 
 52. Id.; see also Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 
62 (2009) (noting that “[m]odern DNA testing can provide powerful new evidence unlike 
anything known before”); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 306 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., 
concurring) (“I believe that judicial recognition of this new science, and of the profound questions 
that it occasions, should, given law’s foundational concern for the determination of guilt and 
innocence, be unbegrudging.”). 
 53. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62 (noting that modern DNA technology can identify individuals 
“with near certainty”). 
 54. BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11. 
 55. Touch DNA, DNA FORENSICS, http://www.dnaforensics.com/touchdna.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2013); see Angela L. Williamson, Touch DNA: Forensic Collection and Application to 
Investigations, J. ASS’N CRIME SCENE RECONSTRUCTION (Jan. 26, 2012, 6:38 AM), 
http://www.acsr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Williamson.pdf (explaining that people “shed 
tens of thousands of skin cells each day,” and listing potential sources of touch DNA as 
“weapons, vehicles, and clothing” as well as “bullet casings, documents, and latent fingerprints”).  
For information on how cells are collected for testing, see BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11. 
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behind when he or she has used a large amount of force, which deposits cells 
on a victim’s clothing or other items implicated in the crime.56  Touch DNA 
testing uses the same STR and PCR technology used to test more traditional 
sources of DNA—blood, semen, saliva, and other bodily fluids—to test 
recovered epithelial cells. 57   The difference between “traditional” DNA 
testing—the testing of bodily fluids—and touch DNA testing is the material 
from which the DNA is collected, not the method by which the DNA sample is 
analyzed.58 
Although touch DNA testing uses the same PCR-STR technology that is 
used to test other widely accepted sources of DNA, it has failed to garner the 
same approval as its bodily fluid progenitors.59  Touch DNA has received 
                     
 56. See, e.g., Ex Parte Hammond, 93 So. 3d 172, 175–77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (ruling on 
whether to allow DNA testing of pants, a wallet, fingerprints on a refrigerator, a towel, shirt, 
shoelaces, and car interior in a murder trial).  Richard Eikelenbloom, the Dutch touch-DNA 
specialist responsible for the exculpatory testing in the Masters case, reenacted the crime to 
determine where on the victim’s clothes there could have been enough force for skin-cell transfer.  
Drawn to Murder, supra note 2; see also Maureen Callahan, CSI: For Hire, N.Y. POST (Dec. 14, 
2008, 3:52 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_cFtlsWfOk57J9 
3gB3DJt7O/1. 
 57. Touch DNA is analyzed by first increasing the sample size through PCR amplification 
and subsequently analyzing the sample with STR technology.  BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 
11.  Another method of analysis, “Low Copy Number” (LCN) analysis, builds a DNA profile 
from as few as five to twenty cells, thereby requiring more cycles of amplification than traditional 
PCR analysis.  Id.  By contrast, touch DNA testing refers to a larger sampling of DNA that is 
replicated via traditional PCR analysis, which “[is] therefore admissible in court.”  Id.; see also 
Max Houck & Lucy Houck, What is Touch DNA?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 8, 2008), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=experts-touch-dna-jonbenet-ramsey.  This 
distinction is important in evaluating condemnations of the technology, as critics sometimes 
confuse the two.  See, e.g., Paula Hoffman Wulff, Low Copy Number DNA: Reality vs. Jury 
Expectations, 41 PROSECUTOR 34 (May/June, 2007) (equating LCN DNA and touch DNA when 
many of her critics are targeted at LCN’s much smaller sample size and need for additional 
replication). 
 58. BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11.  Although some courts still question the reliability 
of touch DNA evidence, the STR technology—the same technology used to test blood and other 
“traditional” sources of DNA—used to analyze skin cells has been widely accepted.  See Harvey 
v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., concurring) (recognizing that STR testing, 
although requiring “literally cellular-size samples only,” is capable of distinguishing “between 
any two individuals on the planet”); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that  
STR-PCR testing is the most common method of DNA analysis used in the criminal justice 
system). 
 59. For example, in State v. Nevius, the court rejected the defendant’s petition for touch 
DNA testing because there was no evidence that such testing was “generally accepted within the 
relevant scientific community.”  See State v. Nevius, No. 04-10-0985, 2012 WL 2361516, at *19 
–20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 7, 2012).  The court referred to touch DNA as “a new DNA 
amplification method,” which shaped the court’s analysis of its reliability and admissibility.  Id. at 
*19; cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text.  Additionally, although the judge in Nevius 
dismissed the petition, it was without prejudice, and the court indicated it would reconsider the 
petition with an expert report addressing the speculative aspects of the request.  Nevius, 2012 WL 
2361516, at *20.  Similarly, a study of the use of DNA to solve property crimes in Denver, 
Colorado, indicated that, although touch DNA is a helpful tool, it does not surpass the reliability 
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tenuous popular, 60  investigative, 61  and judicial 62  attention, and courts have 
expressed concerns about using touch DNA evidence in both pretrial and  
post-conviction proceedings.63  Like the Hood court, many other courts have 
denied requests to use touch DNA evidence.64  At best, judicial reception of 
                                                
and usefulness of traditional blood and semen samples.  Simon Ashikhmin et al., Using DNA to 
Solve High-Volume Property Crimes in Denver: Saving Money, Lowering Crime Rates and 
Making Denver Safer, 42 PROSECUTOR 34, 39–40 (July/Aug/Sept. 2008). 
 60. Touch DNA analysis gained notoriety in the Jon Benet Ramsey case, in which the 
Ramseys were exonerated—outside of legal proceedings—of any involvement in their daughter’s 
murder.  Houck & Houck, supra note 57.  Additionally, touch DNA has received national 
recognition as a possible tool in solving cold cases around the country.  Kevin Johnson, ‘Touch’ 
DNA Offers Hope in Cold Investigations, USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 2008, at 2A. 
 61. Law enforcement in some communities routinely use touch DNA analysis in their 
investigations.  See, e.g., Ashikhmin, et al., supra note 59, at 40 (citing the use of touch DNA to 
solve property crimes in Denver, Colorado, but noting that touch DNA is less effective than blood 
or saliva); Anita Hassan, Investigators Using ‘Touch DNA’ to Solve Property Crimes, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE (Mar. 12, 2012, 12:41 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston 
-texas/article/DNA-is-solving-property-crimes-3397341.php (discussing efforts of a Texas 
community to use touch DNA more frequently for vehicle burglaries and thefts because skin cells 
may be left behind even when a perpetrator was wearing gloves); Virginia Hennessey, Monterey 
Police Rely More on ‘Touch DNA’ to Find Suspects, MONTEREY HERALD (Aug. 13, 2012, 8:20 
PM), http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_21294142/Monterey-police-rely-more-touch-dna 
-find-suspects (highlighting the use of touch DNA to issue no-name arrest warrants, based 
entirely on DNA profiles, to arrest suspects who have left touch DNA evidence on various 
surfaces). 
 62. Raynor v. State, 29 A.3d 617, 626 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (finding no privacy right 
in touch DNA left behind by the defendant while sitting in a chair in the police barracks, which 
the police later used to tie him to the crime in question), cert. granted, 52 A.3d 978 (Md. 2012); 
State v. Reynolds, 926 N.E.2d 315, 317–18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (granting the defendant’s 
request for post-conviction DNA testing, which included touch DNA analysis); State v. Guerrero, 
No. M2008-02839-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2306078, at *4–5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 2011) 
(affirming the defendant’s conviction, which was based on the investigators finding his DNA on 
the grip of a rifle used in the murder); State v. Dick, 280 P.3d 445, 448–49 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) 
(affirming the defendant’s conviction, which was based, in part, on touch DNA that matched the 
defendant and was found on a bandana). 
 63. Montez v. State, 86 So. 3d 1243, 1244–45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding the 
case for an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of touch DNA to determine the authenticity 
and reliability of the evidence); see also State v. Carver, 725 S.E.2d 902, 908–09 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2012) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns about the sufficiency of touch DNA evidence 
in the absence of any other evidence, the lack of precedent for its use, and the questionable 
accuracy of the technology due to the potential for contamination in the form of secondary skin 
cell transfer, or “if person A touches person B, and person B touches a pen, person A’s DNA can 
be found on the pen”), aff’d, 2013 N.C Lexis 52 (N.C. Jan. 25, 2013); Swearingen v. State, 303 
S.W.3d 728, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (rejecting the defendant’s petition for  
post-conviction touch DNA testing, in part because of the lack of expert testimony establishing 
the likelihood that skin cells were deposited on the evidence). 
 64. State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 190 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (rejecting the defendant’s 
petition for post-conviction touch DNA testing), appeal denied, 33 A.3d 739 (2011); Hood v. 
United States, 28 A.3d 553, 566 (D.C. 2011) (same); Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d at 733 (same). 
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touch DNA evidence has been mixed, and its use is often restricted by statutes 
construed similarly to the IPA.65 
D.  Exonerating the Wrongfully Convicted: Guaranteeing Access to  
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Through Statute 
Although DNA exoneration has occurred pre-trial,66 DNA exculpation has 
had a more profound impact post-conviction.67  Consequently, states began to 
acknowledge that the right to exculpatory evidence pre-trial—based on the 
landmark ruling in Brady v. Maryland 68—should also apply to post-conviction 
proceedings.69  The recognition of the impact of post-conviction DNA analysis 
led to widespread efforts to establish the right to post-conviction DNA testing, 
which is now codified in forty-nine states.70 
Despite the growing importance of post-conviction DNA testing,  
post-conviction testing statutes impose several procedural requirements that 
can severely restrict an applicant’s access to testing. 71   These restrictive 
provisions reflect the tension between the state’s interest in allocating limited 
                     
 65. See infra Part II (explaining the restrictions that post-conviction DNA statutes placed on 
the use of touch DNA). 
 66. See, e.g., R. v. Pitchfork, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 963, [1]–[2], [11], [13] (Eng.), available 
at 2009 WL 1321737 (reaffirming the defendant’s 1988 sentencing).  The defendant’s conviction 
was based on DNA evidence that also exculpated a prior suspect.  BROOKS, supra note 46, at 342 
n.1. 
 67. As of June 2013, DNA evidence is responsible for more than 300  
post-conviction exonerations.  Know the Cases: Innocence Project Case Profiles, THE 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited June 1, 2013). 
 68. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the prosecution violated due process by 
withholding from the defendant exculpatory evidence). 
 69. Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that, because the 
goals of discovery are “the facilitation of the administration of justice and the promotion of the 
orderly ascertainment of the truth,” the requirement to disclose exculpatory information applies to 
post-conviction requests for forensic testing); State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250, 253 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1991) (anticipating that, because of the growing utility of DNA testing, the failure 
to grant the defendant’s motion for post-conviction testing could violate Brady); Dabbs v. 
Vergari, 149 Misc. 2d 844, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (recognizing a right to post-conviction DNA 
testing by applying the Brady principles to post-conviction proceedings); Commonwealth v. 
Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425–26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (remanding the defendant’s case for DNA 
testing based on persuasive authority from other states interpreting Brady).  The Supreme Court 
did not extend Brady to recognize a constitutional right to post-conviction DNA testing, but 
instead determined that it was more appropriate for state legislatures to resolve the issue.  Dist. 
Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68–69 (2009). 
 70. Oklahoma remains the only state without a post-conviction DNA testing statute.  Access 
to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org 
/Content/Access_To_PostConviction_DNA_Testing.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
 71. See generally Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything You Read: A Review of 
Modern “Post-Conviction” DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 355 (2002) (detailing 
several restrictions on post-conviction DNA testing, including filing timelines, materiality 
requirements, financing, and testing procedures). 
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resources and the inmate’s right to post-conviction relief.72  The U.S. Supreme 
Court acknowledged this tension in District Attorney’s Office for the Third 
District v. Osborne, recognizing the value of DNA evidence in exonerating the 
wrongfully convicted while simultaneously accepting a state’s need to 
condition access to post-conviction remedies for practical purposes.73 
To balance these interests, post-conviction DNA testing statutes contain 
various threshold burdens that a petitioner must satisfy.  For example, citing 
the Court’s rationale in Osborne, the Connecticut Supreme Court explained 
that, “[t]o reconcile these competing interests, legislatures have imposed 
various threshold showings, including materiality requirements.”74  Materiality 
requirements, contained in almost every state’s post-conviction statute, 
mandate that the requested testing must produce either a reasonable probability 
of a different outcome, or evidence that in some way supports the petitioner’s 
claim of innocence.75  Additionally, post-conviction DNA testing statutes often 
contain threshold provisions in the form of biological material requirements, 
which dictate the specific types of material a petitioner may—or may  
not—submit for testing.76  The ease with which a petitioner can gain access to 
DNA testing under a state’s statute depends on the strength of and relationship 
between these requirements.77 
1.  The Innocence Protection Act: D.C. Code Sections 22-4131 to 22-4135 
In 2001, the IPA was adopted following a public hearing to consider the 
fashioning of a “set of procedural rules for relief from wrongful conviction” 
that reflected the growing trend of legislation enacted to allow for DNA testing 
                     
 72. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62–63. 
 73. Id.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel Alito explained that restricting post 
-conviction access to DNA testing served the interests of promoting finality of judgment and 
conserving public resources.  Id. at 76–77, 83–84 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 74. State v. Dupigney, 988 A.2d 851, 860 (Conn. 2010) (citing Osborne, 557 U.S. at 63) 
(applying the Osborne Court’s rationale of balancing interests to the interpretation of 
Connecticut’s post-conviction DNA testing statute). 
 75. See Swedlow, supra note 71, at 367–68 (explaining that all state post-conviction DNA 
testing statutes contain some sort of materiality requirement, although the required burden of 
proof differs); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (recognizing that “materiality” 
under Brady requires “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”).  Some statutes require a lesser 
showing than Brady materiality.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (2001 & Supp. 2012) 
(requiring “evidence that would help establish that the applicant [is] actually innocent”); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC., § 8-201(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (requiring that the 
requested testing has the potential to produce evidence relevant to the petitioner’s innocence). 
 76. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (requiring the petitioner to test “biological material,” 
defined in D.C. CODE § 22-4131(2) (2001 & Supp. 2012)); Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 
559–63 (D.C. 2011) (interpreting the IPA’s definition of “biological material”). 
 77. See infra Part II (explaining the impact of materiality and biological material 
requirements on a petitioner’s access to touch DNA in several states). 
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post-conviction.78  The D.C. Council justified enacting the IPA, in part, on the 
ground that nineteen other states had similarly codified of a right to post 
-conviction access to DNA testing.79 
The IPA’s burden scheme, requiring both materiality and testable—per the 
IPA’s definition—biological material, demonstrates the typical structure of a 
post-conviction DNA testing statute.80  To apply for testing under the IPA, a 
petitioner must: (1) ensure that biological material is still available for testing 
and explain why it was not tested previously; (2) submit an affidavit asserting 
his actual innocence; and (3) satisfy a materiality requirement.81  Since its 
enactment, District of Columbia courts have interpreted and qualified the 
IPA’s procedural restrictions. 
a.  Interpreting the IPA: Hood v. United States 
The seminal decision interpreting the IPA’s post-conviction DNA testing 
provisions is Hood v. United States.82  The Hood case arose from a robbery 
and murder committed in Northwest Washington, D.C., on the night of May 
18, 1989.83   Police found Charles Hood in the home of Helen Chappelle 
following a violent struggle that ultimately caused her death.84  Hood was 
arrested and charged with first-degree murder, among other charges. 85  
Although Hood argued at trial that an unknown third party was responsible for 
Chappelle’s death, he was ultimately convicted in March of 1991.86 
                     
 78. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29. 
 79. Id.. 
 80. See infra Part I.D.1.a.i–ii (discussing the IPA’s materiality and biological material 
requirements). 
 81. D.C. CODE § 22-4133; see also United States v. Cuffey, No. F-3044-97, 2003 WL 
23202076, at *2 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2003) (discussing the requirements that petitioners must 
meet under the IPA to obtain post-conviction DNA testing). 
 82. 28 A.2d 553 (D.C. 2011).  The Hood decision provides the most comprehensive 
discussion and interpretation of the requirements an applicant must satisfy under section 22-4133 
of the IPA. 
 83. Id. at 555–57. 
 84. See id. at 555–56.  Witnesses saw Hood run past Chappelle into her house, and then saw 
her follow him inside.  Id.  The witnesses also heard sounds of a struggle and Chappelle yelling 
and screaming as if in pain, followed by silence.  Id.  The police found Chappelle semi-conscious, 
resulting from a severe beating to her head and face.  Id. at 556.  Chappelle died eleven days later 
from her injuries.  Id. 
 85. Id. at 556.  A jury convicted Hood of one count of first-degree burglary with intent to 
steal, one count of first-degree burglary with intent to assault, one count of mayhem while armed, 
one count of armed robbery of a senior citizen, one count of first-degree murder while armed 
under the theory of felony murder during the commission of mayhem, and one count of first 
-degree murder while armed under the theory of felony murder during the commission of armed 
robbery.  United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Supplemental Application for Post-Conviction 
DNA Testing and Motion for New Trial at 1–2, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (Crim. No. F-5686-89) 
[hereinafter United States’ Opposition]. 
 86. Hood, 28 A.3d at 557. 
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After the court denied his direct appeal, Hood filed several pro se motions 
for post-conviction relief.87  Hood’s fifth motion, filed in 2002, implicated the 
newly enacted IPA, resulting in the court’s appointment of counsel to assist 
Hood in applying for DNA testing.88  Hood’s petition included a request for 
touch DNA analysis of several items collected at the crime scene.89  The trial 
court denied Hood’s motion, finding that he failed to satisfy both the biological 
material and materiality requirements of section 22-4133.90  On appeal of the 
trial court’s order, the D.C. Court of Appeals defined the limits of the IPA’s 
restrictions in the context of a post-conviction request for touch DNA testing.91 
i.  Defining “Biological Material” 
The IPA defines “biological material” as “a sexual assault forensic 
examination kit, semen, vaginal fluid, blood, saliva, visible skin tissue, or 
hair.”92  The presence of one of these seven biological materials is necessary to 
obtain DNA testing under the IPA. 93   Before enacting the IPA, the D.C. 
Council heard testimony from Executive Assistant Chief Terrance Gainer of 
the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), who explained that the 
department did not have the proper facilities to fully support the evidence 
preservation provision of the IPA.94  The Council accommodated the MPD’s 
                     
 87. United States’ Opposition, supra note 85, at 2.  Hood filed his pro se motions under 
section 23-110 of the D.C. Code, which allows an inmate to attempt to reduce his or her sentence, 
alleging that the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient.  D.C. CODE § 23-110 (2001 
& Supp. 2012); United States’ Opposition, supra note 85, at 2–3. 
 88. Brief for Appellee at 14, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (No. 08-CO-1581), 2010 WL 8020321 
(explaining that Hood requested DNA testing of several pieces of evidence, including the victim’s 
rings, a knife and scissors found near the victim, a wrench found in a drawer, and both Hood’s 
and the victim’s clothing).  The court ordered testing of Hood’s clothing and the knife for blood 
evidence, but that testing was inconclusive.  Supplemental Application for Post-Conviction DNA 
Testing and Motion for New Trial at 3–4, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (Crim. No. F-5686-89) [hereinafter 
Supplemental Application]. 
 89. Because testing for blood evidence was inconclusive, Hood requested touch DNA 
testing on the victim’s rings, the wrench, the handle of the knife, and a purse with a broken strap 
found near the victim.  Supplemental Application, supra note 88, at 11. 
 90. The trial court denied Hood’s motion for touch DNA testing on the grounds that 
epithelial cells do not meet the IPA’s definition of “biological material” and that the presence of a 
third party’s skin cells on the items in question would neither include nor exclude Hood as the 
true perpetrator.  Order at 6–8, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (Crim. No. F-5686-89). 
 91. Brief for Appellee at 3–4, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (No. 08-CO-1581), 2010 WL 8020321. 
 92. D.C. CODE § 22-4131(2) (2001 & Supp. 2012) (defining “biological material”). 
 93. D.C. CODE § 22-4133(a) (2001 & Supp. 2012) (outlining when a party may request 
testing of biological material); see also D.C. CODE § 22-4131(5) (defining “DNA testing”). 
 94. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29 (referring to the provision of Bill 14-153, whichwould 
eventually become D.C. Code § 22-4134, which requires law enforcement to preserve evidence 
collected from a crime scene for as long as the convicted perpetrator is incarcerated). 
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“very valid concern”95 by expressly defining “biological material” so that the 
MPD need only preserve “small samples of blood, or hair, and not entire 
automobiles and couches.”96 
Although the IPA’s definition of biological material specifically requires 
“visible skin tissue,” the IPA’s legislative history provides no definition of the 
term “visible.”97  In construing the term’s meaning, the Hood court relied on 
the plain meaning of the statutory language and legislative intent.98  Drawing 
on the Council’s concerns about evidence preservation, the court ultimately 
defined “visible” as “perceptible by [normal] vision,” excluding the 
microscopic skin cells tested in touch DNA analysis.99 
The court premised its decision on the structure of the IPA as a whole.100  
Both section 22-4133 (post-conviction DNA testing) and section 22-4134 
(evidence preservation) of the IPA use the same definition of biological 
material. 101  The court explained, “[w]e cannot construe ‘visible’ narrowly 
when the question is whether skin tissue evidence must be preserved for DNA 
testing, yet broadly when the question is whether it is subject to that testing.”102  
Acknowledging the strain of a broad definition of “biological material” on 
police resources for evidence preservation, the court retained a narrow 
definition for all provisions of the IPA, including the post-conviction DNA 
testing provision.103  Short of legislative intervention, the court provided no 
scenario allowing for DNA testing of evidence outside of the exhaustive list of 
biological materials provided in section 22-4131.104 
                     
 95. Id.  As introduced, the original Bill 14-153 did not expressly define “biological 
material.”  Hood, 28 A.3d at 561.  The preservation concerns of the MPD prompted the current 
biological material requirement in the statute.  Id. 
 96. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29.  The Council also noted that the IPA’s preservation 
requirement contains an exception that allows for the disposal of physical evidence after five 
years if the incarcerated individual is notified and given 180 days to apply for DNA testing of the 
evidence.  Id. 
 97. Hood, 28 A.3d at 559 (emphasis added) (addressing the interpretation and definition of 
the term “visible”). 
 98. Id. at 559–61 (construing the term “visible” according to its ordinary meaning, per its 
dictionary definition). 
 99. Id. at 560. 
 100. See id. at 562 (noting the relationship between the DNA testing provisions and the 
evidence preservation provision of the IPA). 
 101. Id. at 562 n.28.  The definitions in section 22-4131 apply to all sections of the IPA.  
D.C. CODE § 22-4131 (2001 & Supp. 2012). 
 102. Hood, 28 A.3d at 562 n.28. 
 103. Id. at 562. 
 104. Although the Hood court focused specifically on touch DNA testing, the court’s 
deference to the statute’s plain language suggests that, short of a direct constitutional challenge, 
only the legislature can alter the statute’s definition of “biological material.”  See id. at 562–63. 
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ii. The Relationship Between Materiality and Actual Innocence 
In revising Bill 14-153, the D.C. Council relied heavily on testimony from 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which emphasized the need to condition access to 
post-conviction DNA testing in order to conserve limited public resources and 
to respect the finality of convictions.105  Finding the testimony persuasive, 106 
the Council included in the IPA the requirement that the petitioner show that 
“there is a reasonable probability that testing will produce non-cumulative 
evidence that would help establish that the applicant was actually innocent” of 
the crime of which he was convicted in order to gain access to DNA testing.107 
The court interpreted this language as a materiality requirement, obligating 
the petitioner to establish “more than a mere possibility that the test results 
would help [the applicant] prove his actual innocence.”108  The petitioner need 
only show that the result of the testing would “assist him to establish his actual 
innocence,” assuming that DNA could be recovered.109  The court made clear 
that a favorable result is only one step in the petitioner’s showing of actual 
innocence.110  The court’s interpretation of the statutory language respects the 
scope of the Council’s purpose, reflecting both the recognition of the need to 
correct wrongful convictions and the need for practical limitations on access to 
testing.111 
                     
 105. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29 (providing the statements of Terrance Gainer, 
Executive Assistant Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department, and Kenneth L. Wainstein, 
U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia). 
 106. Id. (noting the reaction of Councilmember Sharon Ambrose and other members who 
adopted the recommendations). 
 107. D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (2001 & Supp. 2012); United States v. Cuffey, No. F-3044-97, 
2003 WL 23202076, at *3 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2003) (denying the petitioner’s request 
because conclusive DNA testing had already been performed, thus precluding the petitioner from 
showing that testing would produce new evidence that would help establish his innocence). 
 108. Hood, 28 A.2d at 564. 
 109. See Hood, 28 A.3d at 564–65.  The court noted that a petitioner is not always entitled to 
an assumption that DNA testing will provide usable DNA evidence if there is a reason to doubt its 
presence.  Id. at 564 & n.43. 
 110. See id. at 564 n.42 (finding that the purpose of testing under section 22-4133 “is to 
develop new evidence that would support a motion to vacate a conviction or grant a new trial on 
the ground of actual innocence”).  The standard is a lesser showing than the outcome-changing 
materiality under Brady, as the court indicated that the evidence should “support” a motion to 
vacate a conviction or for a new trial under D.C. Code § 22-4135(g)(2) (2001), which requires 
“proof of actual innocence by at least a preponderance of the evidence.”  Hood, 28 A.3d at 564 
n.42; see also infra note 173 and accompanying text (likening the IPA’s materiality requirement 
to a “some evidence” standard). 
 111. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29 (hearing testimony both advocating for broad access to 
a post-conviction DNA testing and advocating for limits on access to testing to preserve limited 
public resources and to ensure the finality of convictions). 
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b. The Innocence Protection Amendment Act of 2012 
Less than a year after Hood was decided, D.C. Councilmember Mary Cheh 
introduced a bill to amend the IPA’s “biological material” definition in section 
22-4131, for the purpose of “ensur[ing that] potentially exonerating evidence 
can be tested for DNA.”112  The amendment seeks to eliminate the “visible” 
qualification of skin tissue as biological material and to add several other 
materials to the definition, including a catchall provision allowing for the 
testing of “other identifiable biological material.”113  The amendment does not 
address the materiality requirement in Section 22-4133 or the potential limits 
imposed by the Hood court’s interpretation.114  The legislation also fails to 
address the concerns raised by the court and Council members on the 
revision’s potential impact on the IPA’s evidence preservation provision.115 
The Council’s Committee on the Judiciary considered the proposed 
amendment during a public hearing on September 15, 2012, with testimony 
from the defense bar and representatives from the U.S. Attorney’s Office.116  
Although the witnesses agreed that the IPA’s definition of “biological 
material” is unduly limiting and out of touch with current DNA technology,117 
the two camps disagreed on the role of the IPA’s materiality requirement in 
broadening access to potentially exonerative DNA evidence. 118   The  
                     
 112. B. 19-880, 19th Council Period (D.C. 2012) (explaining the purpose of the Innocence 
Protection Amendment Act of 2012). 
 113. Id. (defining biological material as “the contents of a sexual assault examination kit; and 
any item that contains blood, semen, hair, saliva, skin tissue, fingernail scrapings, bone, bodily 
fluids or other identifiable biological material that was collected as part of the criminal 
investigation or may reasonably be used to incriminate or exculpate any person for the offense”).  
The amended definition also clarifies that the focus of the definition is the material containing 
DNA, not the evidence from which the DNA was collected.  See id. 
 114. See infra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text (noting the relationship between 
sections 22-4133 and 22-4134). 
 116. Innocence Protection Amendment Act of 2012, DC COUNCIL, 
http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/lims/searchbylegislation.aspx (search “B19-880”) (last visited June 
1, 2013). 
 117. The defense-oriented witnesses supported a broad definition of biological material.  See, 
e.g., The Innocence Protection Amendment Act of 2012: Public Hearing on B. 19-880, Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 19th Council Period, B. 19-880 (D.C. Sept. 25, 2012) (statement of Chief 
Legislative Counsel for the Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia Laura E. 
Hankins) [hereinafter Public Hearing] (supporting the definition’s revision); id. (statement of 
Sydney Hoffmann); id. (statement of Special Counsel to the U.S. Attorney for the District of 
Columbia Shawn Armbrust).  The prosecution-focused witnesses also supported the revision.  
See, e.g., id. (statement of Renata Kendrick Cooper) (supporting the definition’s revision); id. 
(statement of Dr. Jason Kowalski). 
 118. Compare Public Hearing, supra note 117 (statement of Sydney Hoffmann) (arguing that 
a petitioner should not be required to demonstrate a reasonable probability of actual innocence 
before the DNA is tested), and id. (statement of Shawn Armbrust, Executive Director of the Mid 
-Atlantic Innocence Project) (same), with id. (statement of Renanta Kendrick Cooper) (arguing 
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Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project suggested that the materiality requirement 
should be replaced by a relevancy requirement. 119   Conversely, the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office argued that a broad definition of biological material warrants 
a showing of materiality.120  Ultimately, Chairperson Phil Mendelson asked for 
additional briefing on the practices of other jurisdictions to aid in the 
amendment process.121  As of the publication of this Comment, the statute has 
not yet been amended.122 
2.  Maryland Code Section 8-201 
In drafting Maryland’s post-conviction DNA testing statute, the Maryland 
General Assembly cited the release of seventy-six wrongfully convicted 
individuals as reason for the legislation.123  Consequently, the statute has been 
described as “a mechanism for exoneration of the actually innocent.” 124  
Mindful of the focus on actual innocence, the Maryland Court of Appeals in 
Gregg v. State construed section 8-201 of the Maryland Code as crafted to 
promote the ease of access to post-conviction DNA testing.125  The statute’s 
threshold procedural requirements reflect this purpose. 
Maryland requires a defendant both to fulfill a biological material 
requirement and to prove materiality.126  Section 8-201 defines “biological 
evidence” as evidence that “includes, but is not limited to, any blood, hair, 
saliva, semen, epithelial cells, buccal cells, or other bodily substances from 
which genetic marker groupings may be obtained.”127  Section 8-201 does not 
                                                
that the Council must limit the definition of “biological material” with “some notion of 
materiality”), and id. (statement of Dr. Jason Kowalski) (same). 
 119. Id. (statement of Shawn Armbrust) (misinterpreting the Hood decision as requiring the 
same showing of actual innocence for DNA testing as that required by the Brady standard: that 
the DNA test results would undermine confidence in the trial’s outcome). 
 120. Id. (statement of Renata Kendrick Cooper) (explaining that a materiality requirement is 
essential and would “reduce the burden on law enforcement to preserve biological material for 
future DNA testing while still promoting the goals and fairness sought by the IPA”). 
 121. IPA Amendment Hearing, supra note 32, at 00:51:47 (question to testifying witness by 
Chairperson Mendelson). 
 122. See Innocence Protection Amendment Act of 2012, supra note 116 (indicating that the 
Council has not taken action on Bill 19-880 since the September 25 hearing). 
 123. MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEG. SERVS. FISCAL NOTES, REV’D, S.B. 694, 2001 Sess. 
(2001) (explaining that DNA testing exonerated seventy-six individuals nationwide, and in 
sixteen cases, “led to the identification of the real perpetrator”). 
 124. Thompson v. State, 909 A.2d 1035, 1043 (Md. 2006).  When considering the  
post-conviction legislation, the Maryland General Assembly rejected a provision that would only 
allow post-conviction DNA testing if it had been previously unavailable to the defendant.  Id. 
 125. Gregg v. State, 976 A.2d 999, 1009 (Md. 2009) (interpreting the amendment to 
“improve[] the existing remedy by making it easier for qualifying petitioners to establish 
entitlement to such testing”). 
 126. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b) & (c)(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 
2012). 
 127. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(a)(2). 
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exhaustively define biological material; rather, the statute’s “other bodily 
substances” provision functions as a catch-all, suggesting that any material 
containing DNA can be tested.128 
With respect to materiality, section 8-201 instructs the court to order DNA 
testing where “a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the 
scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a 
claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing.” 129   In 2003, the Maryland 
legislature significantly revised the statute in order to “relax[] the standard” for 
entitlement to testing.130  As it stands, the petitioner need only make a prima 
facie case that the test results have the potential for relevance to a claim of 
wrongful conviction, or even to sentencing.131 
3.  Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 64.01 and 64.03 
Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing statute provides an example of a state 
law that was based on the outdated procedures by which convicted individuals 
could obtain DNA testing.132  Article 64.03 was enacted to provide access to 
testing that did not “unnecessarily inhibit[] the use of [DNA] evidence.”133  
Although the Texas legislature does not require the petitioner to prove actual 
innocence, it did construct the statute to address judicial economy and the 
practical use of state resources.134 
                     
 128. Id.  Other states define testable material in a similarly broad manner.  For example, 
Ohio’s statutory definition of biological material is a comparable catch-all provision, defining 
biological material is “any product of the human body containing DNA.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2953.71(B) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012).  Connecticut, on the other hand, provides no 
definition of biological material.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk (2009); see also CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 54-102jj(a)(1) (defining “DNA testing”—applicable to both post-conviction testing and 
evidence preservation—as “forensic deoxyribonucleic acid testing”). 
 129. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c)(1). 
 130. See Gregg, 976 A.2d at 1004–06 (discussing the legislative history of section 8-201).  
The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that the amended statute’s purpose is “to provide a means 
for incarcerated persons to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of 
wrongful conviction or sentencing.”  Arey v. State, 929 A.2d 501, 510 (Md. 2007). 
 131. See Gregg, 976 A.2d at 1011 (approving the petitioner’s request for DNA testing despite 
overwhelming evidence against him). 
 132. See S. RESEARCH CTR., TEX. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 3, 77th Reg. Sess. (Jan. 25, 2001) 
(Westlaw) [hereinafter S. Research Ctr.] (acknowledging as problematic that scientific 
developments in biological evidence have surpassed many DNA testing statutes); see also State v. 
Emerick, 868 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that the development of Y-STR 
testing, in part, prompted changes to the Ohio code to allow “otherwise qualified inmates . . . to 
take advantage of advances in technology that were not available at the time of their trials”). 
 133. S. RESEARCH CTR., supra note 132.  
 134. TEX. H.R., TEX. BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 1011, 78th Reg. Sess. (2003) (noting the number 
of requests the statute’s enactment elicited, expressing concern about the use of resources on 
“frivolous claims” and suggesting limiting court-appointed attorneys to only those cases where 
there are reasonable grounds to file a motion for post-conviction testing); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). 
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Article 64.01 defines “biological material” as “an item . . . that contains 
blood, semen, hair, saliva, skin tissue or cells, fingernail scrapings, bone, 
bodily fluids, or other identifiable biological evidence that may be suitable for 
forensic DNA testing,” which includes “the contents of a sexual assault 
evidence collection kit.”135  On its face, this language resembles that of the 
Maryland statute.136  However, in Swearingen v. State, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals imposed an additional limit, holding that the petitioner must 
provide “concrete evidence” that biological material is present on the items he 
or she wishes to test.137  Although this type of threshold increases the burden 
on the petitioner, it does not categorically exclude certain materials from 
testing.138 
With respect to materiality, a petitioner under the Texas statute must show, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she “would not have been 
convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.”139  
This higher threshold reflects the legislature’s intent “to provide an avenue by 
which a defendant may seek to establish his innocence by excluding himself as 
                     
 135. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a)(1) & (2) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 136. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 
2012), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a)(1) & (2). 
 137. Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 728, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Routier v. 
State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 256 (Texas Crim. App. 2008)) (noting that, under the court’s standard, “a 
mere assertion or a general claim that existence of biological material is probable will fail to 
satisfy the appellant’s burden”).  Connecticut similarly focuses on the presence of biological 
material on evidence rather than the biological material itself.  See State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 
188 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk (2009)) (requiring a factual 
basis in the petitioner’s assertion that the evidence he or she seeks to test contains biological 
material, which the statute does not define). 
 138. See Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d at 732–33 (entertaining the possibility that touch DNA 
could be permissible under the post-conviction DNA testing statute if the petitioner can show that 
biological material is present on the evidence in question). 
 139. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A).  The preponderance of the evidence 
standard applied to Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing statute requires a petitioner to show that 
there is more than a fifty percent chance that he or she would not have been convicted if the 
testing had provided exculpatory results.  In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2010).  Connecticut’s post-conviction DNA testing statute also requires a showing that the testing 
would have altered the trial’s outcome.  State v. Dupigney, 988 A.2d 851, 860–61 (Conn. 2010).  
The court must order testing where the petitioner can demonstrate that “[a] reasonable probability 
exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had 
been obtained though DNA testing.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk(b)(1) (2009); State v. 
Martinez, No. CR94230560, 2007 WL 3011054, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2007) 
(describing section 54-102kk(b)(1) as the “mandatory” provision for DNA testing when a 
petitioner satisfies certain conditions).  The court may still consider a request at its discretion if 
there is a “reasonable probability . . . DNA results . . . would have altered the verdict” or 
sentencing.  Martinez, 2007 WL 3011054, at *10 (describing section 54-102kk(c)(1) as a 
“discretionary” provision).  In either situation, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability 
that the testing could have altered the outcome of the original trial.  State v. Smith, No.  
CR95-68537, 2009 WL 3738829, at *1–2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2009). 
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the perpetrator of the offense.”140  The Court of Appeals of Texas determined 
that a petitioner can satisfy the statutory burden by showing that the testing 
would exclude him as a culpable party and corroborate a defense of 
misidentification.141 
II.  FAILURE TO BALANCE IMPORTANT INTERESTS: INEFFECTIVE STATUTORY 
CONSTRAINTS ON TOUCH DNA 
The Hood decision conclusively determined that the IPA—in its current 
form—does not support touch DNA testing.142  The District of Columbia may 
be the first and only jurisdiction to restrict touch DNA analysis so narrowly 
under its post-conviction DNA testing statute.143  Relatively few jurisdictions 
have addressed whether a request for touch DNA testing can satisfy the 
statutory requirements for post-conviction DNA testing.144  Still, the Hood 
court noted that District of Columbia “appears to be the only jurisdiction in the 
                     
 140. Lyon v. State, 274 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added); Blacklock 
v. State, 235 S.W.3d 231, 232–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (discussing the DNA testing statute’s 
legislative history).  Ohio’s post-conviction DNA testing statute contains a similar exclusionary 
restriction, limiting testing to instances where “the offender shows that DNA exclusion . . . would 
have been outcome determinative” at his or her original trial.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 2953.74(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012).  The statute could also permit DNA testing if 
it would demonstrate innocence by clear and convincing evidence.  State v. Ayers, 923 N.E.2d 
654, 658 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (noting that the statutory phrase “strong probability” effectively 
reduces the burden to a clear and convincing evidence standard). 
 141. In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d at 644–45.  In this case, the appellant sought testing of a 
blood-stained bandana in order to establish that it contained the DNA of the victim and an 
unknown third party, but not that of the appellant.  Id. at 641.  Taking all of the evidence into 
account, including inconsistencies in circumstantial evidence and the defense theory of exclusion, 
the court held that if the DNA testing corroborated the defense theory, “there [was] greater than a 
50% likelihood that the jury would have harbored a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s being the 
murderer,” thus satisfying the standard.  Id. at 645. 
 142. See Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 560–62 (D.C. 2011) (holding that legislative 
intent required the court to construe “visible” as perceptible to the naked eye, thus ruling out 
touch DNA testing, which uses microscopic cells). 
 143. Even jurisdictions that have denied requests for touch DNA testing have not foreclosed 
the possibility of testing.  See, e.g., State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 189 & n.6 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2011) (holding that a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable basis that there is biological 
material on the evidence he or she wants to test and noting that this standard is similar to the 
Texas standard); Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d 728, 732–33 (entertaining the possibility that touch 
DNA testing may have been allowed if the petitioner had provided more concrete evidence at trial 
that there was biological material on the evidence he sought to test). 
 144. It seems as though the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Maryland Court of 
Appeals are the only highest courts of appeal to consider touch DNA testing under their 
respective state post-conviction DNA testing statutes requirements.  Compare Hood, 28 A.3d at 
559–60 (decided by the D.C. Court of Appeals), and Gregg v. State, 976 A.2d 999, 1002–03 (Md. 
2009) (decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland), with Solman, 29 A.3d 183 (decided by the 
Appellate Court of Connecticut); Evans v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 485 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011) 
(decided by the Court of Appeals of Arkansas), Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d 728, 731–35 (decided 
by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas), and State v. Reynolds, 926 N.E.2d 315 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2009) (decided by the Court of Appeals of Ohio). 
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United States with a statutory right to post-conviction DNA testing that would 
deny testing on trace amounts of skin tissue that might provide exoneration,” 
amounting to a call for legislative action dependent on the practices of other 
jurisdictions.145 
However, this reliance on other jurisdictions is misplaced.  In the states that 
have considered touch DNA testing, the disposition of touch DNA testing 
requests has depended on which requirement—materiality or  
biological material—is the most burdensome to the petitioner. 146   The 
operative requirement in adjudicating a touch DNA testing request, in turn, is 
often determined by the way the state balances the rights of the petitioner with 
the interests of the state in the drafting its post-conviction DNA testing 
statute.147  Differing statutory construction among states has resulted in varied 
treatment of touch DNA, including statutes that either disregard practical 
resource concerns or acutely restrict the petitioner’s right to potentially 
exonerative evidence. 
A.  Promoting the Interests of the State and Finality of Conviction: Statutes 
that Effectively Preclude Touch DNA Testing 
In Osborne, the Supreme Court recognized that states must be able to 
balance the petitioner’s right to post-conviction relief with the state’s right to 
preserve its existing statutory framework.148  Although claiming to address the 
rights of the petitioner, states that have denied requests for touch DNA have 
generally crafted their statutes with a greater emphasis on resources. 149  
Consequently, these statutes, in addition to a stringent materiality requirement, 
impose a prohibitive biological material requirement. 
1.  Judicial Prescription of Testable Material: A Restriction on Touch DNA 
Testing 
A petitioner seeking touch DNA testing in a jurisdiction that gives greater 
weight to state resource concerns must first convince the court that the 
evidence in question conforms to the jurisdiction’s definition of testable 
                     
 145. Hood, 28 A.3d at 563.  During the public hearing for the Innocence Protection 
Amendment Act of 2012, Chairperson Mendelson requested briefing on the practices of other 
jurisdictions.  IPA Amendment Hearing, supra note 32, at 00:51:47. 
 146. See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining that touch DNA is generally precluded in jurisdictions 
with strict biological material requirements); infra Part II.B.2 (explaining that  
touch-DNA testing is allowed in states where materiality is the petitioner’s only burden). 
 147. See Hood, 28 A.3d at 562–63.  The court recognized the legitimate liberty interest in 
post-conviction DNA testing under the IPA, but ultimately concluded that the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in Osborne allows states “considerable ‘flexibility’” in structuring the application 
process for such testing.  Id. 
 148. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62–63 
(2009). 
 149. See supra Part I.D.1–3. 
2013] Touch DNA in Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes 843 
evidence.150  This limitation on the scope of what is eligible for post-conviction 
DNA testing controls the resources a state must expend in preserving 
evidence.151  As the Hood court explained, a broad definition of “biological 
material” could necessitate preservation of “entire automobiles and couches” in 
the event that these items contain skin cells.152 
The Hood decision ensured that touch DNA is not testable as a matter of law 
under the IPA’s definition of biological material, regardless of the viability of 
the evidence or its potential to exonerate the petitioner. 153   The court 
recognized the potential for its ruling to contravene the IPA’s purpose, but 
concluded that this question could not be resolved judicially.154 
The Hood opinion highlighted that the problem with obtaining  
post-conviction DNA testing lies not in the fallibility of touch DNA 
technology, but rather in the IPA’s structural deficiencies.155  The rationale for 
the narrow interpretation of the “visible” qualification—the difficulty in 
preserving microscopic biological material—in no way implicates the IPA’s 
DNA testing provisions.156  However, as the court noted, each provision of the 
IPA uses the same definition of “biological material,” including the  
definition of “DNA testing” and the section requiring preservation of 
evidence.157  Concluding that the same term could not be construed differently 
depending on its function—which implicitly recognizes the conceptual 
difference between testing and preservation—the court narrowly defined the 
IPA’s biological material requirement and prioritized resource conservation 
over the protection of the right to post-conviction DNA testing.158 
Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a request for touch 
DNA based on the appellant’s failure to satisfy the post-conviction DNA 
                     
 150. State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 188 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (requiring a petitioner to make 
a threshold statement that biological material is present for testing and to provide a factual basis 
for that assertion). 
 151. See, e.g., id. at 189 (explaining that a broad definition of biological material “would 
require that virtually every piece of evidence in the state’s possession be subjected to DNA 
testing”). 
 152. Hood, 28 A.3d at 561 (citing D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 29) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 153. Id. at 562–63 & n.37 (noting that STR testing could be used successfully to analyze 
touch DNA samples).  The court recognized a small window of opportunity for a constitutional 
challenge to the definition of “biological material,” were the petitioner to demonstrate sufficient 
materiality.  Id. at 562–63.  Hood raised, in the alternative, a constitutional argument: a narrow 
interpretation of “visible” violated his due process right to demonstrate his innocence.  Id.  
However the court avoided deciding that issue.  Id. 
 154. Id. at 560, 563. 
 155. Id. at 564–66. 
 156. The D.C. Council added the skin-tissue qualification specifically to lessen the evidence 
preservation burden on the city.  See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 157. See D.C. CODE § 22-4131 (2001 & Supp. 2012) (providing definitions that apply to the 
entire IPA). 
 158. See Hood, 28 A.3d at 560–62 & n.28. 
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testing statute’s biological material requirement.159  In Swearingen v. State, the 
court denied the petitioner’s request for touch DNA analysis, holding that the 
petitioner’s assertion that biological material could be recovered from items of 
evidence that the perpetrator touched alone was insufficient to meet the 
statute’s threshold requirement that “concrete evidence” of the presence of 
biological material be shown.160  The court acknowledged, in passing, that a 
plain reading of the requirement seems categorically to preclude the use of 
touch DNA testing, as it is almost impossible to determine whether biological 
material is present without first performing the touch DNA analysis.161 
Rather than obligating the petitioner to simply apply to test material 
containing DNA, these statutes require the petitioner to demonstrate that the 
evidence he or she seeks to test falls within a statutorily defined category of 
testable material, a burden that has proved difficult, if not impossible, to 
overcome for touch DNA testing.162  The District of Columbia and Texas both 
impose biological material requirements judicially, rather than scientifically, to 
define testable biological material.163  This is an unnecessary limit on valuable 
technology.164 
2.  More Stringent Materiality: Necessary Conditioning of Touch DNA 
Testing 
Although statutes with stringent materiality requirements impose greater 
limits on touch DNA testing, the petitioner may still satisfy the requirement 
under the proper circumstances.165  For example, the D.C. Court of Appeals 
                     
 159. Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 728, 730, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
 160. Id. at 732–33 (interpreting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a) (West 2006  
& Supp. 2012)). 
 161. See id. at 732.  The court noted that the petitioner had not provided any expert testimony 
at trial to establish that skin cells would necessarily have been deposited in the course of that 
particular crime.  Id. at 732–33. 
 162. See Hood, 28 A.3d at 562–63; Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d at 731–32 (setting forth the 
criteria a petitioner must meet to qualify for post-conviction DNA testing). 
 163. Compare supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text (detailing the D.C. Court Appeals’s 
interpretation of the IPA’s biological material requirement), and supra notes 135–38 and 
accompanying text (noting the additional burden the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals added to 
the Texas statutes biological material requirement), with infra notes 176–80 and accompanying 
text (explaining that the definition of testable material in Maryland and Ohio is constrained only 
by what materials can undergo DNA testing). 
 164. See infra notes 193–98 and accompanying text (explaining that, because of the 
materiality requirement, additional limits on “biological material” are unnecessary and 
unreasonable). 
 165. Materiality requirements are the traditional safeguard for state resources.  Dist. 
Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 63 (2009) (explaining that 
“[a] requirement of demonstrating materiality is common” among state efforts to place conditions 
on access to evidence).  States with express concerns about resource conservation and 
preservation tend to impose a higher materiality threshold than those jurisdictions focused on the 
right to post-conviction testing.  Compare MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (allowing testing if there is a “reasonable probability” that 
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found that Hood failed to demonstrate materiality under the IPA based on his 
theory that touch DNA testing would point to the true perpetrator.166  The court 
reasoned that the presence of a third party’s skin cells was not dispositive 
because it would merely show that the third party touched “ordinary personal 
and household objects . . . at some point in time.”167  Confining its analysis to 
the facts of Hood’s case—a request to use touch DNA evidence to identify the 
true perpetrator—the court did not provide any insight regarding whether a 
request for touch DNA testing could ever satisfy the IPA’s materiality 
requirement.168 
The court left unanswered the next logical question: whether touch DNA 
testing sought to exclude the petitioner would demonstrate sufficient 
materiality under the IPA.  By comparison, a petitioner can meet the Texas 
post-conviction DNA testing statute’s high materiality threshold based on a 
theory of exclusion.169  Although the Texas Court of Appeals denied a request 
for touch DNA testing in Swearingen based on the state of the biological 
evidence,170 it is reasonable to believe that a petitioner could meet the statute’s 
materiality requirement with a request for touch DNA testing to exclude 
himself as the perpetrator.171 
By analogy, this exclusion argument could be applied to the IPA.  Although 
worded differently, both the District of Columbia and Texas materiality 
requirements focus on the applicant’s guilt, requiring evidence of actual 
innocence or, similarly, that the applicant would not have been convicted.172  
                                                
testing may “produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence” relevant to conviction or sentencing), 
with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (allowing 
testing only if the applicant “establishes by a preponderance of the evidence” that he or she 
“would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing”). 
 166. Hood, 28 A.3d at 564–66. 
 167. Id. at 565. 
 168. The court determined that the presence of a third party’s skin cells on the items Hood 
sought to have tested could “not have explained” the “other highly incriminating evidence 
against” him.  Id. at 565 n.46. 
 169. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A).  A petitioner can satisfy this 
requirement by demonstrating that DNA testing would reveal the absence of his or her DNA on 
the evidence in question.  In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d 634, 641–42 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) 
(recognizing that an exclusion argument will satisfy the statute’s materiality requirement). 
 170. Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (denying the request 
for touch DNA testing because the petitioner failed to provide “concrete evidence” that the items 
in question contained biological material).  The court did not engage in any discussion of the 
statute’s materiality requirement.  Id. at 731–33. 
 171. The appellant sought the testing to inculpate another individual, which would not fit the 
proposed exclusion scenario.  Id. at 731. 
 172. The Texas statute requires evidence that “the person would not have been convicted if 
exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.”  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
64.03(a)(2)(A).  Comparatively, the IPA mandates “a reasonable probability that testing will 
produce non-cumulative evidence that would help establish that the applicant was actually 
innocent of the crime for which the applicant was convicted or adjudicated as delinquent.”  D.C. 
CODE § 22-4133(d) (2001 & Supp. 2012). 
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Moreover, the IPA, as interpreted in Hood, appears to impose a lower burden, 
resembling a “some evidence” standard. 173   By extension, if an exclusion 
argument could satisfy Texas’s harsh materiality requirement, it should be 
sufficient to provide “some evidence” of the petitioner’s innocence under the 
IPA. 
B.  Protecting Post-Conviction Rights: Statutes That Allow for Touch DNA 
Testing 
Of those jurisdictions that have considered a petition for touch DNA testing 
in a full appellate opinion, courts have allowed touch DNA testing where the 
post-conviction DNA testing statute emphasizes remedying wrongful 
conviction.174  Consequently, these statutes impose minimal restrictions, in the 
form of broad biological material and materiality requirements, on the 
petitioner seeking access to DNA testing.175 
1.  Inclusive Definition of Biological Material: Proper Language to Permit 
Touch DNA Testing 
Statutes that appear to weigh the rights of the petitioner more heavily than 
the state’s interest in preserving resources provide a greater opportunity to take 
advantage of new technology by requiring only that the petitioner seek to test 
material containing DNA. 176   Because epithelial cells necessarily contain 
                     
 173. According to the Hood court, the IPA’s materiality requirement “evidently” obligates 
the petitioner to establish “more than a mere possibility that the test results would help [the 
applicant] prove his actual innocence.”  Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 564 (D.C. 2011).  
However, the court considered this to be a showing “comparable”—not identical—to the 
traditional burden of “undermining confidence in the trial’s outcome.”  Id.  This is a relatively 
broad reading that suggests something closer to a “some evidence” standard than one that requires 
a change in the outcome of the trial.  By analogy, in the District of Columbia, a defendant is 
entitled to a jury instruction on his or her theory of the case if there is “any evidence fairly 
tending to bear upon the issue,” however tenuous it may be.  Rhodes v. United States, 354 A.2d 
863, 864 (D.C. 1976) (citing Belton v. United States, 382 F.2d 150, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).  For 
example, to warrant an instruction on inducement in the D.C. Superior Court, the defendant must 
provide “some evidence [of inducement by] the government agent.”  Instruction 9.310: 
Entrapment, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 9–11 (Barbara E. 
Bergman ed., 2012); see also Hernandez v. United States, 853 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 2004) 
(finding that an instruction for self defense is warranted where the defendant provides “some 
evidence”).  A defendant need not establish his or her defense by a preponderance of the evidence 
in order to demonstrate entitlement to a jury instruction.  See Instruction 9.310: Consent Defense 
to Sexual Abuse, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra, at 9–16 (explaining the lowering of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard). 
 174. See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text (explaining the pro-inmate focus of the 
Maryland and Ohio post-conviction DNA testing statutes); infra note 185 (noting that the Ohio 
post-conviction DNA testing statute values inmates’ rights over judicial economy). 
 175. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.  For example, Maryland limits DNA 
testing only by requiring that a DNA sample can be obtained from the evidence in question.  
Section 8-201 allows for testing on any “bodily substances from which genetic marker groupings 
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DNA,177 this type of biological material requirement does not restrict touch 
DNA testing in any way.178  Worded broadly to allow the statute to evolve with 
DNA technology, these biological material “requirements” recognize that a 
judicially prescribed “testable sample” is no longer a logical possibility.179  
Whether the evidence contains testable DNA is more properly in the purview 
of the “testing authority,” rather than a threshold determination for the court.180 
2.  Broad Materiality: Insufficient Limits on Touch DNA Testing 
As a consequence of a liberal biological material requirement, the discussion 
of whether touch DNA testing is permitted under this type of statute focuses on 
whether the petitioner can satisfy the materiality requirement.  For example, in 
Gregg, the Maryland Court of Appeals granted the appellant’s petition for 
touch DNA testing.181  The court held that the request met section 8-201’s 
“reasonable probability” standard “to produce exculpatory or mitigating 
evidence.”182  Based on the argument that touch DNA analysis would connect 
a third party to the crime,183 the court concluded that the petitioner’s request 
met the statute’s materiality threshold.184   Unconstrained by the efficiency 
concerns underlying the IPA’s materiality requirement, Maryland’s broad 
                                                
may be obtained,” and specifically enumerates epithelial cells.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC.  
§ 8-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012). 
 177. BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11.  The Hood court also accepted that skin cells 
contain DNA.  See Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 560 (D.C. 2011). 
 178. The opinions analyzing touch DNA petitions in jurisdictions with broad definitions of 
biological material make no mention of whether touch DNA satisfies that requirement.  See e.g., 
Gregg v. State, 976 A.2d 999, 1011 (Md. 2009) (requiring a petitioner to present only a prima 
facie case that DNA testing has a reasonable probability to produce evidence of exculpation or 
mitigation of an offense); State v. Reynolds, 926 N.E.2d 315, 317–18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) 
(deferring to the “testing authority” to determine the feasibility of touch DNA testing). 
 179. This was an important consideration raised in the context of revising the IPA.  See IPA 
Amendment Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Shawn Armbrust) (explaining that a broad 
definition of biological material ensures that the statute will have the flexibility to incorporate 
new technology without revision). 
 180. Reynolds, 926 N.E.2d at 319 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by 
drawing its own conclusions about whether the evidence in question would produce a testable 
DNA sample).  Because of “[t]he sensitivity and specificity of modern DNA analysis,” it is 
improper for the court to define a “testable sample” based only on the briefings of lawyers.  
Public Hearing, supra note 123 (statement of Dr. Jason Kolowski); see also Reynolds, 926 
N.E.2d at 319. 
 181. Gregg, 976 A.2d at 1001–02 (requesting DNA analysis of epithelial cells recovered 
from the trigger of a gun). 
 182. Id. at 1011 (reiterating the statutory requirements for post-conviction DNA analysis). 
 183. The petitioner alleged that a third party, who fired the murder weapon, was present at 
the crime scene in the “getaway” van.  Id. at 1001, 1011.  The petitioner was in the car and 
admitted to touching the barrel of the gun, which precluded an exclusion argument.  Id. at 1002. 
 184. Id. at 1011 (holding that because “DNA testing of epithelial cells has the scientific 
potential to produce relevant exculpatory or mitigating evidence, the petition, on its face, 
satisfie[d] that standard”). 
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materiality requirement echoes the Ohio Court of Appeals’ assurance that there 
is “no viable argument that matters of judicial economy should supersede the 
law’s never-ending quest to ensure that no innocent person be convicted.”185 
Although more likely to remedy wrongful convictions, statutes with liberal 
materiality requirements invite criticism of practicality and sufficiency, 
especially in their treatment of touch DNA testing.  Much of the concern 
surrounding the use of touch DNA evidence rests on the sufficiency of  
skin-cell analysis to identify the perpetrator of the crime.  For example, in State 
v. Carver, the North Carolina Court of Appeals expressed doubt that touch 
DNA was enough to convict the defendant, citing secondary skin-cell 
transfer 186  as a source of possible inaccuracy in touch DNA evidence. 187  
Similarly, the Hood court explained that the presence of a third party’s skin 
cells would prove only a third party’s one-time presence at the crime scene, not 
that the cells were deposited by the perpetrator during the crime.188  Both 
courts noted the shortcomings of touch DNA technology in identifying the 
actual perpetrator, a function that a broad materiality requirement supports.189 
III.  “WE ARE ARGUING OVER WORDS HERE”190: STATUTORY LANGUAGE TO 
ENSURE POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO TOUCH DNA TESTING 
The variable construction of post-conviction DNA statutes has resulted in 
inconsistent standards for the permissibility of touch DNA testing.  In some 
jurisdictions, allowing for touch DNA analysis based on a broad materiality 
requirement invites criticism of technological imperfections and the failure to 
address the problem of limited resources.191  In others, severely restricting 
testable material seems to preclude touch DNA testing altogether, disregarding 
the petitioner’s post-conviction rights.192  The proper standard is a blending of 
both jurisdictional approaches to impose a solid materiality requirement and a 
flexible definition of biological material in order to most effectively take 
advantage of touch DNA technology. 
                     
 185. State v. Ayers, 923 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (commending the Ohio 
General Assembly for “lowering the standard required to show that DNA testing can be outcome 
determinative”). 
 186. See supra note 63 (explaining the concept of secondary skin-cell transfer, a problem 
unique to touch-DNA inculpation). 
 187. State v. Carver, 725 S.E.2d 902, 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (Hunter, J., dissenting), aff’d, 
736 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. 2013).  The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in a memorandum opinion, declining to comment on the sufficiency or 
shortcomings of touch DNA evidence.  Carver, 736 S.E.2d 172. 
 188. Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 565 (D.C. 2011). 
 189. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text (providing the facts of Gregg, in which 
the actual perpetrator was inclupated by touch DNA evidence). 
 190. IPA Amendment Hearing, supra note 32, at 01:03:41 (Chairman Mendelson 
commenting on the importance of choosing the proper language for the amended IPA). 
 191. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra Part II.A. 
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A.  Elimination of the Judicially Prescribed Testable Sample 
A traditional standard of materiality as it applies to touch DNA testing 
places a reasonable limit on what a petitioner can test.193  But this standard also 
requires a correspondingly broad biological material requirement to ensure the 
proper balance between post-conviction rights and the interests of the state.194  
Because both requirements aim to conserve state resources,195  an onerous, 
statutorily imposed biological material threshold is unnecessary.196  A more 
difficult materiality requirement necessarily limits what evidence the petitioner 
can test.197  Therefore, a strict materiality requirement can soundly coexist with 
a biological material requirement that simply requires the petitioner to request 
DNA testing of “any product of the human body containing DNA.”198 
                     
 193. See infra notes 214–16 and accompanying text (listing the positive results of a relatively 
strict materiality requirement, including conservation of resources and avoiding deficiencies of 
positive identification through touch DNA analysis). 
 194. The Supreme Court has recognized the need for this balance.  See Dist. Attorney’s 
Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 63 (2009) (emphasizing that  
post-conviction DNA testing “laws recognize the value of DNA evidence but also the need for 
certain conditions on access to the State’s evidence”).  But, many post-conviction DNA testing 
statutes fail to establish the proper balance between the rights of the petitioner and the interests of 
the state.  See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the problems of broad materiality requirements); see 
also supra Part II.A.1 (explaining the challenges of strict biological material requirements). 
 195. See State v. Dupigney, 988 A.2d 851, 860 (Conn. 2010) (citing conservation of 
resources as the rationale for the strict materiality requirement in Connecticut’s post-conviction 
DNA testing statute); State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 189 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (citing 
conservation of resources as the rationale for the heightened biological material requirement in 
Connecticut’s post-conviction DNA testing statute). 
 196. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (explaining the impropriety of a judicial 
determination of what constitutes a testable DNA sample). 
 197. By limiting post-conviction DNA testing to situations where the absence of the 
petitioner’s DNA would implicate guilt or innocence, the legislature assuaged concerns that 
petitioners would seek to test “virtually every piece of evidence in the state’s possession.”  
Solman, 29 A.3d at 189.  In the context of touch DNA, the petitioner would likely be limited to 
testing those pieces of evidence where the perpetrator would most likely deposit skin cells, such 
as the victim’s clothing or the murder weapon.  See MASTERS WITH LEHTO, supra note 4, at  
363–64 (explaining that the touch DNA analyst uses the crime scene and the facts of the crime to 
determine “where force would have been applied by the perpetrator” in order to choose evidence 
from which skin cells could be extracted). 
 198. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.71(B) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (defining 
“biological material”).  Testifying at the public hearing for the Innocence Protection Amendment 
Act of 2012, a representative from the District of Columbia U.S. Attorney’s Office explained that 
an expanded definition of biological material necessitates a more restrictive materiality 
requirement in order to properly balance increased access with concerns about state resources.  
Public Hearing, supra note 123 (statement of Renata Kendrick Cooper).  The inverse is also true; 
a more restrictive materiality requirement, such as limiting touch DNA testing to theories of 
exclusion, mandates a broader biological material requirement to properly balance the competing 
interests. 
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Although these principles can, and should, be applied to the revision of the 
IPA, the statute’s structure requires a slightly different analysis.199  The current 
proposed amendment broadens the statute to include touch DNA, but fails to 
address the concerns raised by the Hood court.  The strict definition of 
“biological material” is in place to support the preservation requirement, and 
thus cannot be changed without affecting that section of the IPA.200  The two 
sections serve different purposes and should be treated differently. 
Consequently, the IPA’s current definition of biological material, with the 
“visible” qualification, should stand.  However, that definition should only 
apply to the section of the IPA providing for the preservation of such 
material.201  DNA testing requirements should reflect the need and justification 
for greater access to testable materials, and thus should be restricted  
only to “forensic DNA testing,”202 which is essentially the same as defining 
“biological material” as “any product of a human body containing DNA.”203  
This can be accomplished by altering section 22-4131’s definition of “DNA 
testing” to reflect this language, and by amending section 22-4133 to allow for 
“DNA testing,” provided that the other requirements are met.204 
B.  “Strict” Materiality: Invoking Exclusionary Principles 
The proper materiality requirement in a post-conviction DNA testing statute 
requires a relationship between the outcome of the testing and the applicant’s 
                     
 199. The use of the same definition of “biological material” across each of the four 
substantive statutes of the IPA, regardless of each statute’s different purpose, makes it difficult to 
simply redefine the term.  See D.C. CODE § 22-4131(a) (2001 & Supp. 2012). 
 200. See Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 562 & n.28 (D.C. 2011).  Bill 19-880 proposed 
to redefine “biological material” without addressing the interplay between the sections of the IPA.  
See B. 19-880, 19th Council Period (D.C. 2012). 
 201. See D.C. CODE § 22-4134 (2001 & Supp. 2012) (requiring preservation of biological 
material).  Such a limitation allays MPD concerns about resource conservation.  See D.C. COMM. 
REP., supra note 82. 
 202. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102jj(a)(1) (2009).  Connecticut’s statutory language is 
similar to the definition already incorporated by the IPA, less the reference to “biological 
material.”  D.C. CODE § 22-4131(5) (defining “DNA Testing” as “forensic DNA analysis of 
biological material”). 
 203. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.71(B).  Ohio’s definition of biological material is 
similar to any state with a “catchall provision” that allows for testing of anything containing 
DNA.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).  
Although the two definitions serve the same purpose, Ohio’s definition dispenses with 
unnecessary examples of biological material rendered superfluous by the catch-all provision. 
 204. Therefore, D.C. Code section 22-4133(a) would appear as: “A person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for a crime of violence 
may, at any time after conviction or adjudication as a delinquent, apply to the court for DNA 
testing. . . .”  The pre-conviction DNA testing provision would be similarly implicated, allowing 
for DNA testing without the limiting “biological material” language.  See D.C. CODE § 22-4132 
(2001 & Supp. 2012).  Consequently, the definition of “DNA testing” would read: “‘DNA 
testing’ means forensic analysis of DNA.”  See D.C. CODE § 22-4131(5) (2001 & Supp. 2012). 
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guilt or innocence.205  Importantly, a stricter materiality requirement reduces 
the amount and type of testing available to the petitioner, which in turn helps to 
conserve state resources and ensure the finality of judgment.206  This type of 
materiality requirement, however, does not preclude the use of touch DNA 
evidence in the proper context; a request for touch DNA testing can satisfy 
most materiality standards if the testing is performed for exclusionary purposes 
only.207  Although a more liberally construed statute will permit touch DNA 
testing to exclude the petitioner,208 even the most conservative and restrictive 
materiality standards can support touch DNA testing for purposes of 
exclusion.209 
A materiality requirement necessitating exclusionary testing can also combat 
some of the problems with touch DNA technology.210  Restricting touch DNA 
testing to exclusion nullifies concerns about touch DNA testing’s deficiencies 
in positively identifying third-party perpetrators.211  The petitioner could use 
the testing to indicate that his or her DNA was not present at the crime scene at 
all, thus excluding him or her as the culpable party.212  The important interests 
a strict materiality standard serves, coupled with the benefits of the 
exclusionary requirement such a standard would mandate, indicate that a 
                     
 205. But see MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 8-201(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) 
(resembling a relevancy requirement and connecting the testing only to a general “claim of 
wrongful conviction or sentencing”).  This is undoubtedly a less severe requirement of 
materiality. 
 206. State v. Dupigney, 988 A.2d 851, 860 (Conn. 2010) (citing Dist. Attorney’s Office for 
the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 80–84 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 207. See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining, in part, that strict materiality requirements can still 
allow for touch DNA testing). 
 208. Because Maryland’s section 8-201 requires only that the testing be relevant to a claim of 
wrongful conviction, testing is allowable in order to implicate a third party.  See MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c)(1); Gregg v. State, 976 A.2d 999, 1002–03 (Md. 2009) (permitting touch 
DNA testing to identify the true perpetrator of the crime).  The absence of the petitioner’s DNA 
would be equally relevant, and perhaps more probative. 
 209. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text (explaining how exclusionary testing of 
touch DNA could satisfy the materiality requirements of the District of Columbia and Texas); see 
also Montez v. State, 86 So. 3d 1243, 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (describing the probative 
value of exclusion by noting that “in [a] case involving largely circumstantial evidence, it is 
difficult to imagine that the existence of another person’s [touch] DNA on the murder weapon 
[thus excluding the petitioner] would not have created at least some reasonable doubt in the minds 
of jurors”). 
 210. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text (discussing some problems that limit 
touch DNA testing’s acceptance). 
 211. See, e.g., Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 565 (D.C. 2011) (explaining that “the 
presence of third-party skin cells on [the] objects [in question] might mean someone other than 
appellant or [victim] touch them at some point in time; but that proves nothing, because it would 
not mean that the cells were deposited on the items” at the time of the crime). 
 212. The idea of using DNA for exclusionary purposes is not novel.  With the development 
of PCR amplification, scientists found that the differences between PCR and its RFLP 
predecessor made PCR more appropriate for exclusion.  United States v. Morrow, 374 F. Supp. 
2d 51, 65 (D.D.C. 2005). 
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materiality requirement implicating the petitioner’s guilt or innocence is the 
most appropriate to ensure the effective use of touch DNA analysis. 213  
Consequently, the IPA’s current materiality requirement should remain intact, 
with the understanding that touch DNA testing is only material where it can 
exclude the petitioner.214 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The District of Columbia is in a unique position.  Not only has the 
jurisdiction’s highest court been the first to definitively repudiate the use of 
touch DNA testing post-conviction, but the D.C. Council has initiated an 
amendment process to correct the unduly restrictive IPA in order to better 
reflect its purpose: to confer a post-conviction right to a petitioner to prove his 
or her actual innocence.  Therefore, the District of Columbia has the 
opportunity to serve as an example, both for those jurisdictions that have not 
yet considered touch DNA and for those that have.  The effective revision of 
the IPA has the potential to ensure a statutory construction that will allow for 
touch DNA testing in appropriate situations. 
The most effective post-conviction DNA testing statute recognizes the 
relationship between the materiality and biological material requirements.  
They impose both a materiality requirement that restricts touch DNA testing to 
exclusionary situations and a technologically neutral biological material 
requirement, which remove the determination of whether evidence will 
produce a usable sample from the discretion of the court.  This statutory 
structure appropriately balances the rights of the petitioner to potentially 
exonerative evidence with the preservation of state resources, a balance that 
many post-conviction testing statutes are designed to reflect but have been 
unable to achieve.  Balancing these requirements is paramount to provide 
wrongfully convicted petitioners access to the same testing that aided in the 
exoneration of Timothy Masters. 
                     
 213. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk(b)(1) (2009) (requiring that testing establish a 
reasonable probability that a jury would not have convicted the petitioner if he had presented 
exculpatory DNA evidence at trial); D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (2001 & Supp. 2012) (requiring a 
reasonable probability that testing will help in proving actual innocence);TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (requiring that the petitioner establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that if exculpatory DNA testing had been admitted at trial, the jury 
would not have convicted him or her).  Each of these requirements are conceptually similar, 
requiring evidence that speaks to the petitioner’s guilt, albeit based on different standards of 
proof. 
 214. The materiality language in D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) reads: 
The court shall order DNA testing pursuant to an application made under subsection (a) 
of this section upon a determination that the application meets the criteria set forth in 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section and there is a reasonable probability that testing 
will produce non-cumulative evidence that would help establish that the applicant was 
actually innocent of the crime for which the applicant was convicted or adjudicated as 
delinquent. 
 
